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Introduction	To	speak	of	Wittgenstein	having	a	‘philosophy	of	religion’	is	in	one	way	misleading,	since	he	never	produced	any	sustained	piece	of	writing	in	this	area.	But	religion	was	something	about	which	Wittgenstein	thought	deeply,	and	his	various	scattered	pronouncements	on	religious	belief	and	commitment	are	rich	and	interesting	enough	to	have	exerted	a	strong	influence	on	subsequent	philosophical	thinking	about	religion.	Some	have	even	seen	him	as	the	leading	voice	in	a	radical	and	controversial	philosophical	approach	to	religious	language,	the	approach	that	has	come	to	be	known	as	non-cognitivism	or	anti-realism	in	the	philosophy	of	religion.	It	is	in	fact	doubtful	that	such	an	approach	can	be	retrojected	onto	Wittgenstein	himself,	or	that	it	represents	a	valid	interpretation	of	his	remarks	about	religious	belief.	But	however	that	may	be,	Wittgenstein’s	diverse	reflections	on	religion	do	succeed	in	uncovering	a	number	of	important	features	of	the	religious	outlook	that	are	easily	overlooked,	and	which,	when	properly	grasped,	greatly	enhance	our	understanding	of	what	it	is	to	subscribe	to	a	religious	worldview.	These	include	(but	are	not	exhausted	by)	a	stress	on	religion	as	a	form	of	life;	a	conception	of	religious	claims	as	not	competing	with	scientific	explanations;	the	idea	of	religion	as	a	framework	of	interpretation;	and	an	emphasis	on	religious	allegiance	as	passionate	commitment.	Wittgenstein’s	views	may	not	amount	to	a	systematic	theory	of	religion,	or	of	religious	language,	but	taken	together	they	amount	to	a	distinctive	and	highly	original	contribution	that	no	student	of	the	subject	can	afford	to	ignore.		 Religion,	more	specifically	Christianity,	was	very	important	to	Wittgenstein	in	his	youth,	and	in	certain	ways	it	continued	to	exert	its	influence	right	up	to	the	closing	days	of	his	life.	He	came	from	a	wealthy	Jewish	family,	long	assimilated	into	Viennese	high	society;	his	millionaire	father	was	nominally	Lutheran,	and	his	mother	(whose	father	was	Jewish	though	her	mother	was	not)	was	a	devout	Catholic,	and	she	had	all	her	nine	children,	including	Ludwig,	baptised	as	Catholics	(Kerr,	2008,	p.	28).	Although	Wittgenstein	underwent	a	crisis	of	faith	during	his	time	at	secondary	school,	we	know	that	by	his	early	twenties	he	was	still	intensely	interested	in	Christianity.	He	was	known	during	his	First	World	War	service	as	‘the	one	with	the	Gospels’:	he	had	picked	up	a	copy	of	Tolstoy’s	The	Gospel	in	Brief	in	September	1914,	which	he	‘read	and	re-read,	and	always	had	with	him	under	fire	and	at	all	times’	(Malcolm,	1993,	p.	8).	During	his	time	as	a	prisoner	of	war,	he	decided	to	become	a	schoolmaster,	and	observed	to	a	friend:	‘I’d	most	like	to	be	a	priest,	but	when	I’m	a	teacher	I	can	read	the	Gospel	with	the	children’	(McGuiness,	1990,	p.	274).	Speaking	later	of	this	time,	Wittgenstein	remarked:	‘When	I	was	a	prisoner	of	war	in	Italy,	I	was	compelled	to	attend	Mass	on	Sundays.	I	was	very	glad	of	that	compulsion’	(Rees,	1984,	p.	109).	When	he	was	dying,	in	1951,	Elizabeth	Anscombe	and	other	Catholics	were	at	his	bedside,	and	he	was	given	a	Catholic	burial,	though	one	of	his	friends,	Maurice	Drury,	later	agonized	over	whether	this	had	been	the	right	thing	to	do	(Monk,	1990,	pp.	567-80).	Wittgenstein	could	certainly	not	have	been	classified	as	a	‘believer’	in	any	orthodox	doctrinal	sense;	but	it	is	significant	that	he	
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considered	that	‘Christianity	is	not	a	doctrine’	(VB	p.	28).	Any	possible	turn	back	to	the	faith	in	which	he	was	baptised	would	probably	have	had	to	have	been	on	a	very	different	basis—	one	he	had	vividly	described	over	a	decade	before	his	final	illness:	‘faith	is	faith	in	what	my	heart	needs,	not	my	speculative	intelligence.	For	it	is	my	soul,	with	its	passions,	as	it	were	with	its	flesh	and	blood,	that	must	be	saved,	not	my	abstract	mind’	(VB	p.	33).	In	similar	vein,	he	observed	on	another	occasion:	‘the	Christian	religion	is	only	for	one	who	feels	an	infinite	need	…	To	whom	it	is	given	in	this	anguish	to	open	his	heart	instead	of	contracting	it,	accepts	the	means	to	salvation	in	his	heart’	(VB,	p.	46).<CV	p.52e>	Yet	despite	his	keen	awareness	of	his	own	anguish,	Wittgenstein	himself	never	felt	able	to	accept	the	offered	‘means	of	salvation’.	His	lifelong	wrestling	with	these	problems	went	hand	in	hand	with	his	evolving	philosophical	ideas	on	the	status	of	religious	language,	belief,	and	allegiance;	the	main	elements	in	his	subtle	and	complex	account	will	now	be	examined	in	turn.		
Religious	language	and	the	Tractatus	The	famous	last	sentence	of	Wittgenstein’s	first	published	work,	the	Tractatus	Logico-
philosophicus	(1922),	has	clear	implications	for	the	credal	claims	of	traditional	religion:	
Wovon	mann	nicht	sprechen	kann,	darüber	muß	man	schweigen	(‘what	one	cannot	speak	of,	one	must	pass	over	in	silence’).	The	aim	of	the	Tractatus,	Wittgenstein	explains	in	his	Preface,	is	‘to	set	a	limit	to	thought,	or	rather	not	to	thought,	but	to	the	expression	of	thoughts.’	He	goes	on	to	say	that	it	is	‘only	in	language	that	the	limit	can	be	set,	and	what	lies	the	other	side	of	the	limit	will	simply	be	nonsense.’	The	job	of	language	is	to	represent	facts	in	the	world,	as	a	picture	represents	its	object;	and	it	follows	that	all	that	can	properly	be	said	or	asserted	are	the	empirical	propositions	of	natural	science.	Whenever	someone	wants	to	go	beyond	that,	and	say	something	metaphysical,	then	the	correct	method	in	philosophy	would	be	to	show	the	speaker	‘that	he	had	failed	to	give	a	meaning	to	certain	signs	in	his	propositions’	(T	6.53).			 This	might	at	first	seem	to	prefigure	the	views	of	the	logical	positivists,	who	were	to	dismiss	all	religious	language,	along	with	ethical	and	aesthetic	language,	as	incapable	of	verification	and	therefore	nonsense;	but	Wittgenstein’s	position	is	more	delicate	and	more	interesting	than	this.	In	the	closing	sentences	of	the	Tractatus,	he	talks	about	‘the	mystical’	(das	Mystische):	it	is	not	how	things	are	in	the	world	that	is	mystical,	but	that	it	exists	at	all	(6.44).	And	he	goes	on	to	mention	some	of	the	ideas	that	have	traditionally	been	the	concern	of	religion—	God,	death,	the	meaning	of	life.	We	are	left	with	the	thought	that	‘there	is	that	which	cannot	be	put	into	words’	(es	gibt	Unaussprechliches)	but	which	can	somehow	make	itself	manifest,	or	‘show	itself’	(zeigt	sich,	6.522).	Though	Wittgenstein	does	not	explicitly	put	it	this	way,	his	position	seems	to	leave	room	for	the	idea	that	religious	talk,	though	‘nonsense’	in	the	strict	sense	laid	down	by	a	correct	theory	of	language,	might	nevertheless	somehow	be	illuminating.	For	there	are	things	that	can	be	shown,	even	though	they	cannot	strictly	be	said	(cf.	4.1212).		 The	upshot	is	that	there	is	an	ambivalence	in	Wittgenstein’s	attitude	in	the	
Tractatus	to	the	claims	of	religion,	which	(though	he	himself	never	draws	any	such	parallel)	is	in	some	respects	reminiscent	of	what	one	finds	in	Kantian	philosophy.	Kant	in	the	Critique	of	Pure	Reason	had	roundly	condemned	attempts	to	establish	matters	lying	outside	the	limits	of	the	phenomenal	world	described	by	science:	if	we	leave	the	solid	terrain	of	the	‘land	of	truth’	(das	Land	der	Wahrheit),	and	launch	out	into	the	‘wide	and	stormy	ocean’,	invoking	‘transcendent’	ideas,	relating	to	objects	that	‘lie	outside	all	possible	experience’,	then,	Kant	argued,	‘we	are	cut	off	from	any	reasons	that	could	establish	the	possibility	of	such	objects’	(Kant,	1965	[1781/1787]),	A565,	B593).	And	in	
John Cottingham, Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion 3 
a	similar	way,	Wittgenstein’s	insistence	that	‘the	limits	of	language	are	the	limits	of	my	world’	(T	5.6)	seems	on	the	face	of	it	to	close	the	door	on	any	speculative	metaphysics	of	the	traditional	kind	that	attempted	to	make	assertions	about	God.	But	just	as	Kant,	despite	his	views	on	the	limits	of	knowledge,	was	able	to	‘make	room’	for	religious	faith	(1787,	B,	Introduction,	p.	xxx),	so	Wittgenstein	evidently	retained	a	respect,	perhaps	even	a	reverence,	for	the	domain	of	the	mystical,	albeit	that	domain	could	never	be	captured	in	language.	In	this	way,	Wittgenstein’s	position	puts	one	less	in	mind	of	the	later	verificationist	steam-roller	of	logical	positivism	than	of	the	much	earlier	‘apophatic’	tradition	in	Jewish	and	Christian	religious	thought,	which	insists	on	the	‘breakdown	of	speech’	that,	in	the	face	of	the	unknowability	of	God,	‘falls	infinitely	short	of	the	mark’	(Turner,	1995,	p.	19).	In	lectures	given	some	ten	years	after	the	publication	of	the	Tractatus,	Wittgenstein	discusses	the	realm	of	ethics	and	value—	a	domain	he	had	called	‘transcendental’	in	the	closing	part	of	the	Tractatus,	treating	it,	along	with	the	aesthetic	and	the	religious	domains,	as	part	of	the	‘mystical’—	and	he	uses	a	striking	image	to	convey	the	inadequacy	of	language	in	this	context:	‘Our	words	used	as	we	use	them	in	science	are	vessels	capable	only	of	containing	and	conveying	meaning	and	sense,	natural	meaning	and	sense.	Ethics,	if	it	is	anything,	is	supernatural,	and	our	words	will	only	express	facts;	as	a	teacup	will	only	hold	a	teacup	full	of	water	[even]	if	I	were	to	pour	out	a	gallon	over	it’	(LE	p.	7;	cf.	Clack,	1999,	p.	35).	
	
Later	developments	As	many	commentators	have	noted,	Wittgenstein’s	view	of	the	nature	of	language	and	meaning	underwent	significant	changes	between	the	publication	of	the	Tractatus	and	the	composition	of	his	other	great	masterpiece,	the	Philosophical	Investigations;	and	these	changes	have	important	implications	for	his	view	of	religious	language.	In	the	
Investigations,	we	find	a	much	less	monolithic	conception	of	the	role	of	language:	instead	of	having	the	single	function	of	depicting	states	of	affairs,	language	takes	many	diverse	forms,	just	as	the	tools	in	a	tool	kit	have	many	different	purposes	(PI	14).	There	is	no	general	form	of	language;	rather,	if	we	are	interested	in	meaning	of	linguistic	utterances	we	should	think	about	their	use	in	a	particular	practice	or	activity—	in	a	‘language	game’.	‘The	term	“language-game”	is	meant	to	bring	into	prominence	the	fact	that	the	speaking	of	a	language	is	part	of	an	activity,	or	of	a	form	of	life’	(PI	23).	One	implication	of	this	is	that	it	is	a	mistake	to	try	to	assimilate	all	statements	to	the	fact-depicting	statements	of	natural	science;	and	this	in	turn	opens	the	way	for	construing	religious	language	as	having	an	entirely	different	function	from	the	language	of	science.	
	
Religion	not	a	rival	to	science	The	view	that	religion	is	not	to	be	construed	as	competing	with	science	is	a	consistent	theme	in	Wittgenstein’s	thinking	about	religion.	In	his	‘Remarks	on	Frazer’s	The	Golden	
Bough’	(GB),	Wittgenstein	argues	that	the	anthropologist	James	George	Frazer	committed	a	fundamental	error	in	his	account	of	ritual	practices,	by	trying	to	understand	them	in	quasi-scientific	terms,	as	aimed	at	the	production	of	certain	effects	(cf.	Bouveresse,	2007).	Elsewhere,	Wittgenstein	makes	an	important	distinction	between	faith	and	superstition.	Superstition,	unlike	faith,	‘springs	from	fear	and	is	a	sort	of	false	science’	(CV	82).	To	take	the	baptism	of	a	child	as	an	example,	if	this	is	motivated	by	the	belief	that	it	will	make	the	child’s	life	more	lucky	or	more	successful,	we	have	a	case	of	mere	superstition—	a	kind	of	primitive	pseudo-technology.	To	promote	the	child’s	health	and	wellbeing	one	would	do	far	better	to	have	recourse	to	modern	scientific	medicine.	But	if	the	baptism	is	an	act	of	joyful	affirmation	and	
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thanksgiving	for	the	new	life—	what	Wittgenstein	called	a	‘trusting’	(ein	Vertrauen,	ibid.)—	then	it	is	a	genuine	manifestation	of	religious	faith.		 Wittgenstein’s	point	here	provides	the	material	for	a	possible	riposte	to	a	common	attack	mounted	by	atheist	critics	of	religion	such	as	Sigmund	Freud,	namely	that	religious	behaviour	is	an	infantile	response	to	our	helplessness	and	the	need	for	protection	against	natural	threats—	‘the	majestic,	cruel	and	inexorable	powers	of	nature’	(Freud	1985	[1929],	p.	195);	David	Hume	similarly	traced	the	origins	of	religion	to	the	‘incessant	hopes	and	fears	that	actuate	mankind’	(Hume,	1757,	Ch.	2).	It	is	no	doubt	true	that	many	religious	adherents	have	had	recourse	to	ritual	practices	in	a	desperate	attempt	to	avert	disaster;	but	assimilating	all	religious	belief	and	activity	to	this	model	seems	a	massive	over-simplification.	The	exclamation	of	Job	in	the	Hebrew	Bible,	‘though	he	slay	me,	yet	will	I	trust	in	him’	(Job	1:4)	looks	much	more	like	an	expression	of	Vertrauen	than	an	attempt	at	superstitious	manipulation;	and	many	other	similar	scriptural	texts	could	be	cited.	So	seeing	religion	as	a	primitive,	quasi-scientific	attempt	to	control	a	hostile	world,	while	it	may	fit	the	way	some	religious	practitioners	think,	does	not	seem	to	match	what	is	going	on	in	large	chunks	of	mainstream	religious	thought	and	practice.			 Not	only	does	Wittgenstein	implicitly	reject	the	hostile	construal	of	religion	as	a	primitive	pseudo-technology,	but	he	also	makes	it	clear	that	he	does	not	see	religion	as	in	any	way	assimilable	to	explanatory	cosmology	or	science.	He	had	little	truck	with	the	kind	of	theological	metaphysics	that	attempts	to	present	God’s	existence	as	something	that	can	be	demonstratively	established,	or	even	shown	to	be	reasonably	probable.	A	believer,	he	observed,	would	never	come	to	believe	as	a	result	of	the	supposed	‘proofs’	of	God’s	existence	(CV	85);	and	the	whole	project	of	‘philosophical	theology’,	he	once	remarked,	struck	him	as	‘indecent’	(Drury,	1984,	p.	90).	For	those	(including	many	prominent	theologians	and	philosophers)	who	treat	theism	as	a	probable	hypothesis	for	accounting	for	the	existence	or	nature	of	the	cosmos,	Wittgenstein	appears	to	have	had	something	like	bemused	contempt:	‘can	you	imagine	St	Augustine	saying	that	the	existence	of	God	was	highly	probable!’,	he	remarked	to	Drury	(ibid;	contrast,	for	example,	Swinburne,	2011).	Consistently	with	his	move	away	from	the	monolithic	science-oriented	view	of	language	he	had	espoused	in	the	Tractatus,	Wittgenstein	came	to	think	that	religious	language	should	not	be	thought	of	as	in	any	way	competing	with	science:	it	had	another	function	altogether.		
Forms	of	life,	and	the	importance	of	context	and	praxis	The	lesson	to	be	drawn	from	Wittgenstein’s	later	philosophy	is	that	if	we	wish	to	understand	any	type	of	language,	including	religious	language,	we	have	to	look	at	the	‘form	of	life’	in	which	it	is	embedded.	Wittgenstein’s	interest	in	‘forms	of	life’	(Lebensformen),	was	in	some	respects	a	‘holistic’	reaction	against	the	atomistic	approach	to	meaning	he	had	espoused	in	the	Tractatus	(where	an	individual	proposition	was	taken	to	be	a	‘picture	of	reality’,	T	4.01).	Our	language	games,	he	later	came	to	see,	are	interwoven	with	a	web	of	non-linguistic	activities,	and	cannot	be	understood	apart	from	the	context	that	gives	them	life.	Wittgenstein	insisted	that	‘in	a	religious	discourse	we	use	such	expressions	as:	“I	believe	that	so	and	so	will	happen”	…	differently	to	the	way	in	which	we	use	them	in	science’.	So	to	believe	in	the	Last	Judgement	is	not	assimilable	to	an	ordinary	belief	that	a	certain	event	will	very	probably	happen	at	some	time	in	the	future	(LC,	p.	57).	As	one	commentator	has	aptly	put	it,	Wittgenstein’s	aim	is	to	show	how	concepts	such	as	sin,	redemption,	judgement,	grace	and	atonement	‘can	have	an	indispensible	place	in	an	individual’s	or	a	
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community’s	way	of	life,	and	to	show	how	we	can	resist	assimilating	the	use	of	these	concepts	to	hypotheses,	predictions	and	theoretical	explanations’	(Hyman,	2001,	pp.	6−7).	This	leads	us	straight	to	a	key	feature	of	Wittgenstein’s	mature	understanding	of	language:	his	emphasis	on	the	role	of	activity	or	praxis	in	underpinning	the	way	it	works.	‘It	is	characteristic	of	our	language	that	the	foundation	out	of	which	it	grows	consists	in	steady	forms	of	life,	regular	activity.	Its	function	is	determined	above	all	by	the	action	which	it	accompanies’(CE	404).	This	implies,	in	the	case	of	religious	language,	that	if	we	want	to	grasp	the	meaning	of,	for	example,	the	priest’s	pronouncing	the	words	‘The	Body	of	Christ’	as	he	holds	up	the	consecrated	bread	at	the	Eucharist,	we	cannot	understand	or	evaluate	the	assertion	in	isolation	(in	the	way	we	might,	for	example,	understand	and	evaluate	the	assertion	that	the	wafer	of	bread	is	of	circular	shape	and	9cm	in	diameter);	rather,	we	need	to	place	the	utterance	in	the	context	of	the	entire	liturgy	of	the	Mass,	the	Gospel	story	of	the	Last	Supper,	the	richly	layered	symbolism	of	communally	shared	bread	and	wine,	and	much	else	besides.	This	contrasts	starkly	with	the	stance	taken	by	those	critics	of	religion	who	proceed	to	evaluate	religious	claims	on	the	basis	of	only	a	cursory	grasp	of	their	literal	or	surface	meaning	(compare	the	remarks	on	the	Last	Judgment	offered	in	Dawkins,	2006,	pp.	319ff).	It	does	not	of	course	follow	that	a	richer	contextual	examination	of	the	practices	that	give	life	to	religion	will	end	up	vindicating	those	claims	or	justifying	those	practices;	that	question	is	one	that	Wittgenstein’s	remarks	appear	to	leave	open.	But	without	a	proper	grasp	of	meaning,	which	in	turn	requires	a	preparedness	to	investigate	context	and	praxis	,	the	evaluation	of	truth	cannot	even	get	off	the	ground.		
Wittgensteinian	‘fideism’,	and	his	alleged	‘non-cognitivism’	The	term	‘fideism’,	which	is	often	used	to	characterise	Wittgenstein’s	position	on	religion	(cf.	Glock,	1996,	p.	320),	covers	a	spectrum	of	views	that	emphasise	the	role	of	faith	in	contrast	to,	or	as	a	supplement	to,	reason,	for	the	formation	of	religious	belief.	In	the	middle	ages,	Anselm	and	Aquinas,	along	with	other	Christian	philosophers,	produced	rational	proofs	of	God’s	existence,	but	Aquinas	asserted	that	in	addition	to	the	truths	discoverable	by	natural	reason	there	were	revealed	truths	that	had	to	be	accepted	on	faith	(cf.	Aquinas	1975	[1259-65],	Bk.	I,	chs	4-6);	and	Anselm	described	his	whole	philosophical	enterprise	in	the	Proslogion	by	giving	it	the	subtitle	‘faith	seeking	understanding’	(Anselm,	2008	[1077-8]).	For	both	these	philosophers,	faith	and	reason	have	complementary	roles,	so	their	position	is	very	much	not	an	exclusively	or	even	mainly	a	‘fideist’	one.	Nevertheless,	in	underlining	the	importance	of	faith	(in	Latin	
fides),	they	are	stressing	something	over	and	above	mere	rational	assent	to	a	set	of	doctrines;	for	fides,	like	its	Greek	counterpart	pistis,	always	connotes	a	stronger	volitional	component	than	simple	assent—	some	further	element	of	trust	and	commitment.	As	one	moves	towards	extreme	forms	of	fideism,	such	as	that	of	Søren	Kierkegaard,	the	volitional	element	becomes	stronger.	‘Faith	does	not	need	proof,’	asserted	Kierkegaard,	‘indeed	it	must	regard	proof	as	its	enemy’	(Kierkegaard	1941	[1846],	p.	31)..	And	in	a	famous	passage	he	observed:	‘Christianity	is	spirit,	spirit	is	inwardness,	inwardness	is	subjectivity,	subjectivity	is	essential	passion,	and	in	its	maximum	an	infinite,	personal,	passionate	interest	in	one’s	eternal	happiness’	(ibid.,	p.	182).	Wittgenstein	shared	with	Kierkegaard	the	view	that	passionate	commitment	is	central	to	what	makes	someone	religious;	and	just	as	Kierkegaard	had	argued	that	true	faith	requires	subjective	commitment,	not	objective	certainty	or	probability,	so	Wittgenstein	thought	there	was	something	‘ludicrous’	in	attempting	to	shore	up	the	
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reasonableness	of	religious	belief	in	the	light	of	dispassionate	scrutiny	of	the	evidence	(LC	58).		 The	Kierkegaardian	or	fideist	influences	on	Wittgenstein’s	thought	are	particularly	apparent	in	his	often	quoted	remark	in	Culture	and	Value:	‘it	appears	to	me	as	though	a	religious	belief	could	only	be	(something	like)	passionately	committing	oneself	to	a	system	of	reference’	(CV	73).	The	implication	here	might	be	taken	to	be	that	belief,	in	the	normal	sense	of	the	term,	namely	assent	to	a	proposition	with	a	certain	cognitive	content,	drops	out	of	the	picture	completely	in	Wittgenstein’s	conception	of	religious	faith,	leaving	simply	the	volitional	act	of	committing	oneself.	Extrapolating	from	this,	those	later	writers	who	espoused	a	‘non-cognitivist’	or	anti-realist	approach	to	philosophy	of	religion	maintained	that	religious	language	about	God	should	not	be	understood	as	making	factual	claims,	stating	facts,	or	describing	reality	at	all.	Thus	the	well-known	Welsh	philosopher	of	religion	D.	Z.	Phillips,	explicitly	invoking	Wittgenstein’s	ideas	about	language	games,	stressed	that	if	we	want	to	understand	religious	talk	properly,	we	should	not	interpret	it	as	referring	to	the	‘reality’	of	God.	‘Theological	realism’,	observed	Phillips,	‘often	indulges	in	philosophy	by	italics.	We	are	told	that	we	could	not	worship	unless	we	believed	that	God	exists.	We	are	told	that	we	cannot	talk	to	God	unless	he	is	there	to	talk	to.	And	so	on.	But	nothing	is	achieved	by	italicising	these	words.	The	task	of	clarifying	their	grammar	when	they	are	used	remains’	(Phillips,	1993,	p.	35).		There	are	two	questions	here.	The	first	is	whether	rejecting	a	realist	construal	of	religious	language	is	tenable,	and	the	second	is	whether	this	position	can	be	laid	at	Wittgenstein’s	door.	On	the	first	question,	many	critics	have	insisted	that	the	anti-realist	approach	fails	to	match	the	actual	beliefs	and	practices	of	ordinary	religious	adherents:	‘When	ordinary	people	pray	it	is	because	they	think	there	is	a	God	up	there	listening.	But	whether	or	not	there	is	a	God	listening	to	their	prayer	isn’t	itself	part	of	the	language	game.	The	reason	people	play	the	language	game	of	religion	is	because	they	think	there	is	something	outside	the	language	game	that	gives	it	a	point’	(Searle,	1987,	p.	344-5). What	is	more,	to	say	that	a	religious	belief	just	is	a	commitment	appears	to	sidestep	the	question	of	justification	in	a	problematic	way	(cf.	Hyman	2001).	Commitments,	though	it	may	be	psychologically	possible	to	make	them	in	the	absence	of	prior	beliefs,	seem	to	presuppose,	for	their	validity,	the	objective	truth	of	the	beliefs	logically	required	by	the	nature	of	the	commitment.	If	I	commit	myself	to	a	loved	one,	or	to	God,	my	commitment	will	lose	its	justification	if	the	object	of	my	commitment	turns	out	not	to	exist,	or	to	be	wholly	unworthy	of	my	commitment.	On	the	second	question,	of	whether	Wittgenstein	himself	espoused	this	type	of	non-cognitivist	view,	Severin	Schroeder	has	argued	that	that,	contrary	to	the	common	reading	of	his	remarks	in	Culture	and	Value,	Wittgenstein	is	not	proposing	a	purely	expressivist	construal	of	credal	statements	(Schroeder,	2007).	In	saying	that	religious	belief	‘can	only	be	a	passionate	commitment’,	Wittgenstein	may	simply	be	underlining	the	inescapability	of	a	passionate,	volitional	element;	he	need	not	be	saying	that	what	is	involved	in	the	belief	is	merely	the	commitment—	as	if	nothing	else,	no	cognitive	or	doxastic	(belief)	elements,	were	entailed.	On	the	matter	of	phrasing,	Schroeder	appears	to	have	a	strong	case.	To	say,	for	example,	‘that	remark	can	only	have	been	a	joke’	does	not	imply	that	it	was	humorous	and	nothing	else;	it	does	not,	for	example	rule	out	its	being	apt,	or	malicious,	or	referring	to	a	true	state	of	affairs.	In	any	case,	there	are,	as	Schroeder	points	out,	many	passages	where	Wittgenstein	makes	it	quite	explicit	that	belief	is	involved	in	religious	commitment.	In	the	very	next	sentence	following	his	remark	about	‘passionate	commitment’,	he	goes	on	to	say	‘Hence,	although	it	is	belief,	it	
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is	a	way	of	living,	or	a	way	of	judging	life’	(CV	73).	What	is	more,	we	know	from	other	remarks	that	Wittgenstein	would	have	liked	to	commit	himself	to	Christianity,	but	felt	unable	to	make	the	commitment	because	he	could	not	bring	himself	to	assent	to	the	
required	beliefs—	for	example	a	belief	in	the	last	judgment	(CV	38).	A	further	text	often	cited	in	favour	of	a	non-cognitivist	interpretation	of	Wittgenstein’s	view	of	religious	belief	is	his	remark	that	saying	(as	many	philosophical	theologians	have	done)	that	God’s	essence	guarantees	his	existence	‘really	means	…	that	what	is	here	at	issue	is	not	the	existence	of	something	[daß	es	sich	hier	um	eine	Existenz	
nicht	handelt]’	(CV	82).	Bur	it	would	be	rash	to	read	non-cognitivism	into	this,	given	that	it	is	actually	quite	close	to	standard	mainstream	Christian	theology.	On	the	standard	conception	found	for	example	in	Aquinas,	God	is	not	an	individual	being	at	all,	not	an	‘entity’	alongside	the	other	entities	in	the	world,	but	is	rather	the	source	of	all	being	(Davies,	2002,	p.	72);	so	it	is	not	as	if	the	theist’s	inventory	of	entities	in	the	universe	includes	some	extra	item	that	is	absent	from	the	atheist’s	list.	Hence,	so	far	from	being	a	heretical	slide	into	a	non-cognitivist	or	anti-realist	view	of	God-talk,	Wittgenstein’s	remark	that	in	discussing	God	we	are	not	dealing	with	eine	Existenz	is	one	that	would	seem	quite	in	order	to	many	orthodox	theologians.		As	noted	above	in	our	discussion	of	the	Tractatus,	Wittgenstein	himself	was	attracted	in	his	early	writings	to	the	idea	of	religion	as	related	to	the	domain	of	the	ineffable	(TLP	6.522).	In	the	light	of	this,	it	is	plausible	to	interpret	his	later	thinking	about	religion	as	preserving	the	core	idea	that	our	language	about	God	cannot	be	construed	as	having	straightforward	propositional	content	(in	the	Tractatus	sense),	or	as	asserting	the	existence	of	an	item	in	the	world.	But	none	of	this	entails	a	radically	non-realist	conception	of	religious	discourse;	it	is	simply	that	we	need	to	be	careful	to	avoid	assimilating	the	reality	of	God	to	the	reality	obtaining	within	the	‘world’—	the	reality	possessed	by	contingent	things,	or,	as	the	Tractatus	put	it,	whatever	happens	to	be	‘the	case’.	Wittgenstein	was	clear	that	being	religious	is	not	a	matter	of	proposing	explanatory	hypotheses	about	the	world	of	a	scientific	or	quasi-scientific	kind,	but	rather	of	passionate	commitment	to	a	certain	system	of	reference,	a	certain	framework	for	interpreting	the	world.	But	this	may	be	quite	compatible	with	holding	that	that	to	adopt	the	framework	in	question	does	indeed	involve	assent	to	certain	theistic	beliefs.			
Religion	as	a	framework	of	interpretation	A	religious	person	passionately	commits	him	or	herself,	according	to	Wittgenstein,	‘to	a	system	of	co-ordinates’	(zu	einem	Koordinatensystem).	A	variant	reading	has	the	more	general	phrase	‘a	system	of	reference’	(einem	Bezugssystem)	(CV	73).	These	notions	may	seem	at	first	to	support	the	non-cognitivist	interpretation	of	Wittgenstein’s	views	on	religion;	for	a	system	of	coordinates	(for	example,	the	points	of	the	compass,	or	the	metric	system)	is	not	itself	a	set	of	truth-claims:	‘a	system	of	co-ordinates	is	…	an	intellectual	apparatus	we	use	to	construct	truths	and	falsehoods;	it	cannot	itself	be	either	true	or	false’	(Hyman,	2001,	p.	5).	One	might	draw	a	parallel	here	with	the	case	of	ethics,	where	Wittgenstein’s	mature	view	seems	to	that	‘to	make	[ethical	judgments]	is	to	adopt	a	certain	framework	of	action	and	justification,	which	itself	cannot	be	justified’	(Glock,	1996,	p.	110).	The	point	here	is	that	a	system	of	reference	or	a	system	of	measurement	(for	example	the	metric	system)	cannot	itself	be	called	true	or	false	in	the	sense	that	a	given	measurement	within	the	system	(‘this	stick	is	two	meters	long’)	may	be	true	or	false.	The	metric	system	does	not	itself	belong	in	the	complete	set	of	true	propositions	expressing	metric	measurements;	rather	it	is	a	framework	that	generates	the	possibility	of	such	measurements.		
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This	point,	correct	though	it	is,	does	not	however	prevent	one	affirming	the	soundness	of	the	metric	system	as	a	perfectly	valid	and	rationally	defensible	framework	for	dealing	with	the	world;	and	the	same	possibility	still	seems	open	in	the	case	of	a	religious	framework.	Some	systems	might	be	rationally	defended	as	more	workable,	more	fitted	for	human	life,	more	viable,	than	others.	The	amount	of	‘passion’	with	which	one	commits	oneself	to	the	use	of	such	a	system	does	not	in	itself	affect	this	question	of	rational	evaluability:	no	doubt	some	people	are	passionately	committed	to	the	use	of	metric	standards,	but	that	does	not	put	the	matter	of	the	appropriateness	and	viability	of	the	metric	system	beyond	rational	evaluation,	or	shift	it	to	the	non-cognitive	domain	of	pure	volitional	or	merely	emotional	preference.	There	is,	moreover,	one	further	suggestive	point	about	the	comparison	of	religious	faith	to	a	‘reference	system’,	which	also	pushes	things	in	a	more	‘cognitivist’	direction.	Although	a	system	of	co-ordinates	cannot	itself	be	true	or	false,	the	adoption	of	such	a	system	does	nevertheless	itself	
presuppose	certain	truths—	for	example,	the	actual	reality	of	the	standard	posited	by	the	system	(the	paradigm	‘meter	bar’,	or	the	properties	of	light	in	the	more	sophisticated	standard	now	used).	In	the	same	way,	a	religious	‘system	of	reference’	can	be	said	to	have	cognitive	implications	(by	presupposing	that	supreme	creative	reality	without	which	the	system	would	make	no	sense),	as	well	as	being,	for	those	who	adopt	it,	a	valuable	and	rationally	defensible	way	of	making	sense	of	human	life	(though	‘rationally	defensible’	here	would	not,	as	with	the	metrical	case,	be	understood	primarily	in	scientific	and	technological	terms,	but	rather	in	moral	and	spiritual	terms).		On	this	interpretation,	Wittgenstein’s	central	insight	is	that	the	primary	function	of	a	religious	outlook	is	to	provide	a	framework	for	understanding	and	interpreting	the	world	in	which	we	find	ourselves.	The	religious	adherent	confronts,	as	we	all	do,	a	world	full	of	pain	and	suffering,	conditioned	by	the	inescapable	facts	of	human	finitude	and	mortality;	yet	in	the	face	of	the	resulting	‘anguish’	and	‘infinite	need’	(VB	p.	46)	the	believer	passionately	holds	on	to	a	‘system	of	reference’	that	allows	those	potentially	terrifying	or	depressing	features	to	be	viewed	through	the	eyes	of	faith	and	hope.	What	is	thereby	generated,	without	in	any	way	removing	the	dangers	or	the	suffering,	is	a	sense	of	the	‘peace	that	passeth	all	understanding’	(Philippians	4:7);	or,	as	Wittgenstein	himself	put	it,	‘feeling	absolutely	safe—	I	mean	the	state	of	mind	in	which	one	is	inclined	to	say	“I	am	safe,	nothing	can	injure	me	whatever	happens”	’	(LE,	p.	8).		
The	question	of	evidence	If	the	kind	of	interpretation	just	proposed	is	accepted,	a	crucial	question	remains	about	its	implications	for	the	defensibility	or	otherwise	of	adopting	a	religious	outlook:	does	the	Wittgensteinian	talk	of	holding	fast	to	a	system	of	reference	imply	a	view	of	religion	that	tries	to	insulate	it	from	all	contact	with	evidence	or	argument?	Certainly	Wittgenstein	dismissed	the	idea	that	something	like	the	Resurrection	could	be	established	or	refuted	by	appeal	to	a	‘historical	basis	in	the	sense	that	the	ordinary	belief	in	historical	facts	could	serve	as	a	foundation’	(LC	57).	But	this	separation	of	a	belief	in	the	Resurrection	from	an	‘ordinary’	historical	belief	does	not	in	itself	rule	out	the	possibility	of	evidence	of	a	different	kind.	Wittgenstein’s	point	may	be	that	the	role	of	evidence	in	religious	commitment	is	entirely	different	from	that	which	it	occupies	on	the	‘Humean’	model—	a	dispassionate	scrutiny	of	empirical	probabilities	based	on	past	instances	(the	model	which	made	Hume	dryly	observe	that	‘the	Christian	religion	not	only	was	at	first	attended	with	miracles,	but	even	at	this	day	cannot	be	believed	by	any	reasonable	person	without	one’	(Hume,	1748,	sectn.10)).	The	kind	of	evidence	which,	for	the	believer,	supports	faith	is	not	evidence	assessed	from	a	detached	standpoint,	but	
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experience	that	is	available	only	as	a	result	of	certain	inner	transformations.	This	may	partly	be	what	Wittgenstein	had	in	mind	when	he	remarked	‘Only	love	can	believe	the	resurrection’	(VB,	p.	33).	Saying	this	need	not	imply	some	kind	of	subjectivism	about	religious	truth;	it	merely	makes	the	point	that	there	may	be	some	truths	whose	
accessibility	conditions	include	certain	requirements	as	to	the	attitude	of	the	subject	(cf.	Cottingham,	2005,	ch	5).	In	other	words,	it	may	point	to	what	one	might	call	a	‘Pascalian’	epistemology:	the	idea	that	opening	the	heart	may	have	the	result	of	disclosing	evidence	that	was	before	occluded.	It	is	not	that	there	is	no	evidence	of	any	kind,	but	rather	that,	as	Pascal	put	it,	there	is	‘enough	light	for	those	who	desire	to	see,	and	enough	darkness	for	those	of	a	contrary	disposition’	(Pascal,	1962	[1670],	no.	149).		Interpreting	the	Gospel	accounts	of	the	early	disciples’	belief	in	the	Resurrection	in	Wittgensteinian	terms,	we	may	say	that	they	seized	passionately	upon	a	new	framework	of	interpretation:	what	had	seemed	total	failure,	marked	by	a	horrible	and	humiliating	execution,	was	subsequently	perceived	as	the	prelude	to	the	triumphant	proclamation	of	a	message	of	hope.	As	noted	earlier,	we	do	not	have	to	say	that	this	interpretive	shift	implies	no	cognitive	change—	no	change	in	belief	contents.	In	adopting	such	a	framework,	the	disciples	surely	did	shift	their	beliefs:	with	the	new	framework	went	a	return	from	despair	to	faith	in	God,	and	a	belief	that	his	power	was	manifested	in	the	risen	Christ.	Nor,	picking	up	the	point	just	made	about	evidence,	do	we	have	to	say	that	the	new	belief	was	held	contra-rationally,	or	without	any	evidence	whatever;	what	is	suggested	instead	by	the	Gospel	narrative	(for	example	the	report	that	‘some	doubted’	even	in	the	face	of	the	post	resurrection	appearances	of	Christ,	Matthew	28:17)	is	that	the	evidence	was	not	‘spectator	evidence’,	readily	accessible	to	any	dispassionate	observer,	but	was	evidence	of	the	kind	that	requires	an	inner	transformation	to	enable	the	subject	to	apprehend	it	(cf.	Coakley,	2002;	Moser,	2008).		Attributing	to	Wittgenstein	something	like	this	view	of	the	kind	of	evidence	relevant	to	religious	belief	receives	strong	support	from	one	of	his	most	pregnant	remarks	about	religion:	‘life	can	educate	one	to	a	belief	in	God’	(CV	86).	It	is	clear	that	‘education’	involved	cannot,	according	to	Wittgenstein,	be	the	kind	that	one	receives	in	the	study	or	seminar	room,	through	a	dispassionate	study	of	the	evidence	or	arguments	for	God’s	existence.	Rather,	the	‘lessons	of	life’	are	ones	that	change	one’s	emotional	perspective,	making	one	vulnerable,	opening	the	heart,	so	that	beliefs	one	was	previously	blocked	from	entertaining	seriously	now	become	live	options	(cf.	Cottingham,	2009,	pp.	224ff).	Conversion,	in	short,	is	a	matter	of	breaking	down	the	barriers	to	perception,	or	demolishing	the	defences	we	all	have	against	becoming	open	and	receptive	in	this	way.	Wittgenstein	himself	confessed	in	1946:	‘I	cannot	kneel	to	pray	because	it’s	as	though	my	knees	are	stiff.	I	am	afraid	of	disintegration	(of	my	disintegration),	if	I	become	soft’	(VB,	p.	56).	And	an	enigmatic	remark	made	in	1937	may	also	plausibly	be	taken	as	a	comment	on	his	own	inability	to	become	a	believer:	‘The	edifice	of	your	pride	has	to	be	dismantled.	And	that	means	frightful	work’	(CV	30).	These	considerations	need	not,	of	course,	in	any	way	imply	that	anyone	who	(like	Wittgenstein	himself)	fails	to	take	the	road	to	conversion	is	therefore	making	a	philosophical	or	personal	mistake.	On	this	point,	as	in	all	areas	of	his	life,	Wittgenstein	himself	was	ready	to	be	harshly	self-critical;	but	on	balance	his	views	on	religious	belief	seem	in	the	end	to	be	philosophically	neutral	on	the	question	of	whether	adopting	such	a	perspective	is	the	right	thing	to	do—	albeit	they	often	show	a	distinct	sympathy	for	the	religious	worldview,	and	even	a	longing	for	the	‘safety’	it	seems	to	offer.	What	can	be	said,	as	we	bring	this	discussion	of	Wittgenstein’s	views	on	religion	to	a	close,	is	that	his	rich	and	fertile	remarks	have	the	merit	of	offering	a	far	richer	and	more	humane	
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account	of	religion,	and	one	that	resonates	much	more	closely	with	the	actual	struggles	of	believers,	would	be	believers,	and	those	who	cannot	believe,	than	the	great	bulk	of	contemporary	work	in	philosophy	of	religion.	Here,	as	in	so	many	other	areas,	Wittgenstein’s	ideas,	though	they	may	be	temporarily	eclipsed	by	the	vicissitudes	of	academic	fashion,	seem	sure	to	retain	their	compelling	power	for	many	generations	to	come.	 		
References		Aquinas,	T.	(1975	[1259-65]).	Summa	contra	gentiles,	tr.	A.	Pegis.	Notre	Dame,	Ind.:	University	of	Notre	Dame	Press.		Anselm	(2008	[1077-8]).	Proslogion.	in	B.	Davies	&	G.	R.	Evans	(Eds.),	Anselm:	The	major	
works.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Bouveresse,	J.	(2007).	‘Wittgenstein’s	critique	of	Frazer’,	Ratio	20:4,	reprinted	in	J.	Preston	(Ed).	Wittgenstein	and	reason	(Oxford:	Blackwell,	2008).		Clack,	B.	R.	(1999).	An	introduction	to	Wittgenstein’s	philosophy	of	religion.	Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press.		Coakley,	S.	(2002).	‘Wittgenstein	and	resurrection	epistemology’,	in	Powers	and	
submissions:	spirituality,	philosophy	and	gender.	Oxford:	Blackwell.			Cottingham,	John	(2009).	‘The	lessons	of	life:	Wittgenstein,	religion	and	analytic	philosophy’,	in	H.-J.	Glock	and	J.	Hyman	(Eds).	Wittgenstein	and	analytic	philosophy:	
essays	for	P.M.S.	Hacker	(pp.	203-227).	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Davies,	B.	(2002).	Aquinas.	London:	Continuum.		Dawkins,	R.	(2006).	The	God	Delusion.	London:	Bantam	Press.		Drury,	M.	O’C	(1984)	‘Some	notes	of	conversations	with	Wittgenstein’,	in	R.	Rhees	(Ed.),	
Recollections	of	Wittgenstein.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Freud,	S.	(1985	[1929]).	Civilization	and	its	discontents	[Das	Unbehagen	in	der	Kultur],	in	
The	Penguin	Freud	Library.	London:	Penguin	Books,	Vol.	12.		Glock,	H-J.	(1996).	A	Wittgenstein	dictionary.	Oxford:	Blackwell.		Hume,	D.	(1748).	An	enquiry	concerning	human	understanding.	London:	Millar.		Hume,	D.	The	natural	history	of	religion	(1757).	London:	Millar.		Hyman,	J.	(2001).‘The	gospel	according	to	Wittgenstein’,	in	R.	Arrington	(Ed).,	
Wittgenstein	and	religious	belief	(pp.	1-11).	London:	Routledge.		
John Cottingham, Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion 11 
Kant,	I.	(1965	[1781/1787]).	Critique	of	pure	reason	[Kritik	der	reinen	Vernunft],	transl.	N.	Kemp	Smith,	New	York:	St	Martin’s	Press.		Kerr,	F.	(2008).	Work	on	oneself:	Wittgenstein’s	philosophical	psychology.	Washington:	Catholic	University	of	America	Press.		Kierkegaard,	S.	(1941	[1846])	Concluding	unscientific	postscript	[Afsluttende	
Uvidenskabelig	Efterskrift],	trans.	D.	F.	Swenson.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press.		Malcolm,	N.	(1993).	Wittgenstein:	a	religious	point	of	view?	London:	Routledge.		McGuinness,	B.	(1990).	Wittgenstein:	a	life.	Harmondsworth:	Penguin.			Monk,	R.	(1990).	Ludwig	Wittgenstein:	the	duty	of	genius.	London:	Vintage.		Moser,	P.	K.	(2008).	The	elusive	God:	reorienting	religious	epistemology.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.		Pascal,	B.	(1962	[1670]).	Pensées	Ed.	L.	Lafuma.	Paris:	Seuil,	1962.		Phillips,	D.	Z.	(1993).	Wittgenstein	and	religion.	London:	Macmillan.		Rhees,	R.	(1984).	Ludwig	Wittgenstein:	personal	recollections.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.		Schroeder,	S.	(2007).	‘The	tightrope	walker’,	Ratio	Vol.	XX	no	4,	reprinted	in	J.	Preston	(Ed).	Wittgenstein	and	reason.	Oxford:	Blackwell,	2008.		Searle	J.	(1987).	‘Wittgenstein’,	in	B,	Magee,	The	great	philosophers	(pp.	320-347).	London:	BBC	Books.		Swinburne,	R.	(2011).	‘God	as	the	simplest	explanation	of	the	universe,’	in	A.	O’Hear	(Ed).	Philosophy	and	religion	(pp.	3-24).	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.		Turner,	D.	(1995).	The	darkness	of	God.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.			
Further	reading		Barrett,	Cyril	(1991).	Wittgenstein	on	Ethics	and	Religious	Belief.	Oxford:	Blackwell.		Cottingham,	John	(2005).	The	Spiritual	Dimension.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.		Kerr,	Fergus	(1996).	Theology	after	Wittgenstein.	Oxford:	Blackwell.		Schönbaumsfeld,	Genia	(2007).	A	Confusion	of	the	Spheres.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.	
John Cottingham, Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion 12 
	Phillips,	D.	Z.,	Rhees,	R.,	and	Von	der	Ruhr,	M.	(eds.)	(2005).	Religion	and	Wittgenstein’s	
Legacy.	(London:	Ashgate).					
For	notes	on	contributors	
John Cottingham is Professorial Research Fellow at Heythrop College, University of London, 
Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Reading University, and an Honorary Fellow of St John’s 
College, Oxford. His is an authority on early-modern philosophy, especially Descartes, and has 
published widely on moral philosophy and the philosophy of religion. His recent titles include On the 
Meaning of Life (Routledge, 2003), The Spiritual Dimension (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 
Cartesian Reflections (Oxford University Press, 2008), and Why Believe? (Continuum, 2009). He was 
from 1993 to 2012 Editor of the international philosophical journal Ratio. 
